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FCC REGULATION OF BROADCAST NEWS: FIRST AMENDMENT
PERILS OF CONFLICTING STANDARDS OF REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
In regulating broadcast news reporting,' the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC)2 distinguishes viewer or listener complaints alleging "un-
fair" or "imbalanced" news reporting 3 from complaints alleging "distorted" or
"slanted" news reporting. 4 The FCC applies the "fairness doctrine"5 to
complaints of unfair or imbalanced news reporting and evaluates whether a
broadcaster has acted "unreasonably" and in "bad faith" in its presentation of
contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.6 In
1. This Note refers to "broadcast news reporting" to include only "[blona fide newscasts, bona
fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events." 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1920(b)(4) (1979): see note 42 infra. The FCC has ruled that interviews that are broadcast on
regularly scheduled programs, use a "news interview format," and select interviewees because of
their "public significance . . . and their news interests," will be considered bona fide news
interviews. Socialist Workers 1968 Nat'l Campaign Comm., 14 F.C.C.2d 858, 858 (1968) ("NET
Journal"); accord, CBS, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 601, 601-02 (1976) ("60 Minutes'). The FCC has also
ruled that coverage of a presidential candidate's announcement of his running mate, Republican
Nat'l Comm., 37 F.C.C.2d 799, 806 (1972), and broadcast of the President's State of the Union
Message, Lar Daly v. CBS, 59 F.C.C.2d 97, 97-98 (1976), constitute on-the-spot coverage of a
bona fide news event.
2. The FCC derives its authority to regulate news broadcasting from the Communications
Act of 1934 § 303(r), 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976): "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the
Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall ...
[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent
with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter . . . ." Id.; see The
Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report]; Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254-55 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Report on Editorializing]. See generally FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 795 (1978); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 109-12 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1969).
3. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text.
4. See pt. II infra
5. See pt. I infra. See generally F. Friendly, The Good Guys, The Bad Guys and The First
Amendment (1977); B. Schmidt, Freedom of the Press vs. Public Access (1976); S. Simmons, The
Fairness Doctrine and the Media (1978); Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"-
New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 Fed. Coin. L.J. 201 (1979); Bazelon, FCC
Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 Duke L.J 213; Goldberg & Couzens, "Pecu-
liar Characteristics": An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation,
31 Fed. Com. L.J. 1 (1978); Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on
Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768 (1972); Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudence of Fairness:
Freedom Through Regulation in the Marketplace of Ideas, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 877 (1976), Van
Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 SC.L. Rev,
539 (1978).
6. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317, 1317-19 (1976); W.C.
Ponder v. NBC, 58 F.C.C.2d 1222, 1222-23 (1976); Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 37
F.C.C.2d 942, 943 (1972); J. Allen Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894, 896 (1971); NBC, 25 F.C.C.2d 735,
735-37 (1970); see pts. I(B)-(C) infra.
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contrast, when a complainant alleges distorted or slanted news reporting, the
FCC applies a more stringent standard and will take action only when the
complainant has presented "extrinsic evidence" that the broadcaster deliber-
ately distorted or slanted news.
7
Although the FCC purports to adhere to different standards of proof, the
distinction between complaints of imbalance and complaints of distortion has
become blurred, creating uncertainty as to the proper standard to apply to a
particular complaint.8 Furthermore, the lack of a clear demarcation between
the two types of complaints poses the likelihood that complainants seeking
FCC review of broadcast news judgmentg may frame their complaints in
terms of a fairness doctrine violation in an attempt to proceed under a less
onerous standard of proof. This eventuality creates the threat of excessive
government regulation of the reasonableness of news broadcasters' editorial
discretion and may affect the delicate balance between viewers' and listeners'
first amendment rights of access 9 and broadcasters' freedoms of speech and
press."o The potential for these consequences has been recently demonstrated
by American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC, I, in which the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that a prima facie fairness doctrine
violation is not stated if the issue allegedly given imbalanced news coverage is
vague and ambiguous. 12 Although the court recognized that the prima facie
case requirement restricts government oversight of broadcaster's journalistic
discretion, 13 it is arguable that the prima facie case requirement is an
7. E.g., KItIAP, Inc., 72 F.C.C.2d 241, 244 (1979); Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978).
Pulley v. Station WBFN, 58 F.C.C.2d 1224, 1226-27 (1976), Northwestern Ind- Broadcasting
Corp., 57 F.C.C.2d 686, 694 (1975); Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 591-93 (1969). see pt- II
infra.
8. See pt. II infra.
9. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-03 11973); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
10. The principal first amendment concern underlying government regulation of broadcast
media is promoting open and complete dissemination of information concerning public affairs
See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 121-27 (1973) (upholding FCC
determination that regulatory policy of requiring broadcaster to accept editorial advertisements
would frustrate rather than further first amendment goals). See also FCC v National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 L S
367, 389-90 (1969); Black Producer's Ass'n, 70 F.C.C.2d 1920, 1930 (1979), National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 32 F.C.C.2d 824. 825 (1971): Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F C C-2d 591, 592
(1969).
One of the Carter Administration's goals is to reduce limitations on broadcasters' rights of
expression by eliminating certain fairness doctrine requirements and by promoting pay-cable
television systems, public broadcasting organizations, and creation of more radio stations Steven
J. Simmons, a communications specialist on the White House staff, has stated that - 'broadcast
news shows should not be required to focus on news issue[s]. with Big Brother looking over
their shoulders."' U.S. Ready to Relax F.C.C. Fairness Doctrine, N.Y Times, Feb 4, 1980, § C,
at 13, col. 5. The Carter administration expects, however, that its proposed changes will face
criticism from public interest groups. Id.
11. 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct 662 (1980)
12. Id. at 448-49.
13. See id. at 445-46; pt. I(C) infra.
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inadequate means of protecting the first amendment goal of "robust, wide-
open debate on issues of public importance.' 14
This Note contends that the inconsistency characterizing FCC regulation of
news broadcasting is the result of analyzing similar behavior under different
standards. Despite a semantic distinction, at the core of either a complaint of
news imbalance or news distortion is the assertion that a broadcaster has
improperly exercised its editorial judgment. Therefore, in deference to the
solicitude with which Congress, the federal courts, and the FCC have
generally regarded broadcast journalists' editorial judgment, it is submitted
that all regulation of broadcast news should be governed by the FCC's
extrinsic evidence standard rather than by the lesser good faith and
reasonableness standard now used to effectuate the fairness doctrine.
I. REGULATION OF BROADCAST NEWS UNDER THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
A. Background and Purpose
The central premise of the fairness doctrine is that the limited number of
available broadcast frequencies"5 renders the airwaves "a scarce resource
whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government."' 6
14. Id. at 446 (quoting Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969)); see New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); pt. m infra.
15. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 4; see, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). Broadcasters
are said to act as "public trustees" who must "present representative community views and voices
on controversial issues which are of importance to [their] listeners." Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25
F.C.C.2d 216, 222-23 (1970) (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 389-90,
394), rev'd sub nom. Business Executives' Move for Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Furthermore,
"no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities." CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 113 (footnote and citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has remarked, however, that assigning to broadcasters the role of "proxy" or "fiduciary" of
the public does "not resolve the sensitive constitutional issues inherent in deciding whether a
particular licensee action is subject to First Amendment restraints." Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); see Fairness Report, supra
note 2, at 3-4. Government regulation of the airwaves developed in the late 1920's in response to
the chaos produced by lack of control and rapid growth in the number of operating broadcast
stations. Id. Congress sought to restore order by enacting the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 1-29,
44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 315-29 (1976)), which created the Federal
Radio Commission, charged with regulating frequencies in accordance with "public convenience,
interest or necessity." id. at § 4, 44 Stat. at 1163. The chief concern underlying passage of the
Radio Act of 1927 was a recognition of the danger in allowing a valuable resource to fall under
the domination of entrenched private interests or government hegemony. See Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 375-76, nn. 4-5; S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 22-23; Barron, An
Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 487, 502-09
(1969). The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and its successor, the Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-609 (1976), reveals various attempts by Congress to incorporate a
"fairness" requirement as part of radio regulation. See F. Friendly, supra note 5, at 19-31;
S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 23-29. In 1959, Congress amended § 315(a) of the Communications Act
of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)), specifically
recognizing "the obligation imposed upon [broadcasters]... to operate in the public interest and
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Although the first amendment prohibits government regulation of speech and
press, 17 the fairness doctrine furthers "the paramount first amendment right
of viewers and listeners to receive 'suitable access to . . . ideas and experi-
ences.' "18 Thus, as part of the FCC's regulation of broadcasting "as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires,"' 9 under the fairness doctrine
licensees must present news programs "devoted to the consideration and
discussion of public issues of interest. ' 20 This obligation is imposed because
the "foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting" 2' is the "right
of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the
Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public
to broadcast his own particular views on any matter."2 2 Nevertheless, overly
rigorous enforcement of the fairness doctrine could impair a broadcaster's
ability or inclination to inform the public about important issues through
vigorous and open reporting. 23 Thus, the government and licensees must
constantly "walk a 'tightrope' " to maintain the delicate balance of first
amendment interests.
24
B. Elements of the Fairness Doctrine
Under the fairness doctrine, the FCC imposes a two-fold obligation on
broadcast licensees. First, the broadcaster has an "affirmative responsibility"
to devote a reasonable percentage of broadcast time to coverage of controver-
to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance." Id.; S. Rep. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in [1959] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2564. The Supreme Court construed the 1959 amendment as a ratification of
the fairness doctrine by "positive legislation," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at
381-82, and upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine because of the first amendment
goal "to preserve an uninhibited market place of ideas . . . rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." Id.
at 390 (citations omitted). The Court warned, however, that overly ambitious enforcement of the
fairness doctrine could reduce, rather than improve coverage of public issues, thus acknowledging
the necessity to reconsider the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine from time to time. Id. at
393. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974) (holding
unconstitutional a state statute that required newspapers to print for free a reply by a candidate
for public office whose character or public record was attacked in the newspaper).
17. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const.
amend. 1.
18. American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (en banc) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-80
(1969).
20. Report on Editorializing, supra note 2, at 1249.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
23. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-32 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969); American Security Council Educ. Founda-
tion v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (19S0).
See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
24. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
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sial issues of public importance.2 5 In fulfilling this responsibility, the broad-
caster is afforded a large degree of discretion in deciding which issues to
cover, 26 and is only required to act with "reasonableness" in deciding how to
meet its public interest obligation.
27
The second part of the fairness doctrine charges the broadcaster with "an
affirmative duty to encourage and implement the broadcast of contrasting
views in its overall programming." 28 This requirement generally presents
three factors for the FCC to consider: (1) the specific issues that have been
raised in a particular broadcast; (2) whether such issues are controversial and
of public importance; and, (3) whether the licensee provided a reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints as part of the
overall programming. 29
The first consideration presents "[o]ne of the most difficult problems in-
volved in the administration of the fairness doctrine." 30 The difficulty arises
most often when the FCC must determine whether a program "implicitly"
raised a controversial issue of public importance or whether a certain broad-
cast gave imbalanced treatment to various "subissues. ' '31 Recognizing the
25. Inquiry Regarding The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 74 F.C.C.2d 163, 168 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Fairness Inquiry]; see Reconsideration of The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 693
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration of the Fairness Report]; S. Simmons, supra note 5, at
9.
26. "In the critical area of informing the public as to important issues, the public interest is
well served by the current system in which the licensee in the exercise of its good faith journalistic
discretion determines what controversial issues of public importance exist, what issues to cover,
and how best to present contrasting viewpoints." Fairness Inquiry, supra note 25, at 171.
27. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 10. Although a broadcaster is not required "to cover
each and every important issue which may arise in his community," the FCC has warned "that
some issues are so critical or of such great public importance that it would be unreasonable for a
licensee to ignore them completely." Id. In one instance, the FCC determined that a broadcaster
acted unreasonably by failing to broadcast a program concerning the issue of strip mining to an
area in which the issue had an "enormous" environmental and economic impact. Representative
Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
28. Fairness Inquiry, supra note 25, at 169. The second part of the fairness doctrine
engenders the vast majority of fairness regulation and litigation. See Fairness Report, supra note
2, at 10; S. Simmons. supra note 5, at 146, 166-73; Comment, Enforcing The Obligation To
Present Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 137, 154 (1975).
29. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 10-17; see S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 146.
30. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 12.
31. S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 147; see, e.g., Robin Ficker, 65 F.C.C.2d 657, 658 (1977);
Anti-Abortion Comm., 31 F.C.C.2d 492, 493 (1971); Norman Zafman, 26 F.C.C.2d 297, 298
(1970); A. Burton White, M.D., 18 F.C.C.2d 658, 658-59 ',1969); Mid-Florida Television Corp.,
40 F.C.C. 620, 620-22 (1964). In NBC, 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970) (en bane), tht FCC reversed a
ruling of its Broadcast Bureau that a broadcast raised the issue of whether private pilots
constitute a hazard to air traffic because the broadcaster's judgment that it actually presented the
issue of air traffic congestion around large airports was not unreasonable. Id. at 737; cf. Green v.
FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329-31 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (military recruitment advertisements raised five
distinct issues for fairness consideration: (1) military manpower recruitment; (2) the draft; (3) the
Vietnam War: (4) the morality of participation in any war; and, (5) the appeal of military service).
1980] REGULATION OF BROADCAST NEWS 1231
complexity of analyzing the issues of a news report, the FCC will usually
defer to a broadcaster's good faith judgment as to what issues were raised by
a particular broadcast and only determine whether the broadcaster's evalua-
tion is reasonable.
3 2
To resolve the second question, the FCC has suggested various factors that
the broadcaster should consider when deciding if an issue is controversial and
of public importance. 33 For example, the FCC urges the broadcaster to
determine "whether an issue is the subject of vigorous debate with substantial
elements of the community.134 Similarly, the broadcaster should consider the
amount of media coverage given an issue, the amount of attention accorded
the issue by local leaders, and most important, the effect the issue is likely to
have on the broadcaster's audience. 3s
The third issue, determining whether a broadcaster has afforded a "reason-
able opportunity" for presentation of contrasting viewpoints, "has yet to be
chiseled into stone."13 6 Thus, the FCC may consider many different factors in
evaluating a licensee's compliance with this element of the fairness doctrine,
37
32. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 25, at 697; Fairness Report, supra note
2, at 13; see NBC, 25 F.C.C.2d 735, 736-37 (1970). Although the FCC usually defers to the
broadcaster's good faith judgment, broadcasters are urged to consider whether a program
presents viewpoints that "so obviously and substantially" relate to a controversial issue of public
importance "as to amount to advocacy of a position on that question." Fairness Report, supra
note 2, at 13. The FCC, however, will not take action when the statements complained of are
"offhand or insubstantial." Id.
33. Fairness Inquiry, supra note 25, at 169; Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 11; e.g., Suzuki
v. WOW-TV, 59 F.C.C.2d 1122, 1123 (1976) ("The question of whether such . . . issues are
controversial and of public importance is left to the judgment of the licensee."); Accuracy in
media, Inc. v. WNET, 51 F.C.C.2d 219, 220 (1974) ("It is the responsibility of the broadcast
licensee to determine whether a controversial issue of public importance has been presented.
34. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 12; see, e.g., Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494,
514-15 (1976) (nuclear power), remanded on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Council on Children, Media & Advertising v. ABC, 59 F.C.C.2d 448, 452 (1976) (children's
exposure to commercial advertisements); Females Opposed to Equality, 42 F.C.C.2d 434, 435
(1973) (women's rights).
35. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 11-12; e.g., William Albaugh, 70 F.C.C.2d 1739,
1741-42 (1979) (status of District of Columbia as a federal enclave or legally part of Maryland
found not to be an issue of public controversy to anyone other than the complainant, and thus not
an issue of public importance); Mrs. J. C. Crampton, 56 F.C.C.2d 854, 855 (1975) (broadcast of
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi discussing Transcendental Meditation ruled not to present a controver-
sial issue of public importance). See also S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 154-57.
36. Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Wilderness Soc'y,
31 F.C.C.2d 729 (1971), it was recognized that "in the fairness area, the bond of theory and
implementation has come unstuck and all the principal actors-licensees, public interest advo-
cates, the Commission itself-are in limbo, left to fend for themselves." Id. at 734 (Burch, Ch.,
concurring).
37. E.g., Media Access Project, 44 F.C.C.2d 755, 762 (1973) (amount of time allotted each
point of view); Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues. 25 F.C.C 2d 283,
293 (1970) (amount of programming broadcast during prime time); WCBS-TV, 9 F.C C 2d 921,
941 (1967) (the frequency with which points of view are aired), aff'd sub nora. Banzhaf v FCC,
405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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although the basic requirement "is that the American public must not be left
uninformed. '38 If the broadcaster has acted reasonably and in good faith, 39
the FCC will defer to the broadcaster's discretion "to choose an appropriate
method '4 0 of aiding and encouraging expression of contrasting viewpoints. If
the broadcaster is found to have acted unreasonably and in bad faith,
however, it may either be denied license renewal, 4' or be ordered to supple-
ment its news coverage to satisfy fairness obligations. 42
38. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis deleted); accord, Public
Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963,
964-65 (1978); see Robin Ficker, 65 F.C.C.2d 657, 658 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317, 1319-20 (1976); Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F.C.C. 620, 621
(1964).
39. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 13. The FCC is prohibited from censoring broadcast
media: "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
As a result, the FCC has been constrained not to "attempt to direct broadcasters in the selection
or presentation of specific programming." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d
1317, 1318 (1976). Rather, the FCC has determined that its "role is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the licensee as to . . . programming decisions, but rather to determine whether the
licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith." Applicability of the Fairness
Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer]; see Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra,
note 25, at 697.
40. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F.C.C. 620, 621 (1964); see Dr. Michael Kielty, 69
F.C.C.2d 960, 961 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317, 1318
(1976); Fairness Inquiry, supra note 25, at 169.
41. E.g., Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(radio broadcaster denied license renewal for fairness doctrine violations and misrepresentation of
programming format), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); see 47 U.S.C. § 307(a)-(e) (1976).
42. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 17; see, e.g., Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494,
523 (1976) (radio broadcasters required to inform FCC of method for correcting programming
imbalance), remanded, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979). The
FCC regards the reasonable opportunity requirement as an affirmative obligation that cannot be
met merely by adopting a general policy that opposing views will be broadcast only when "a
demand is made of the station for broadcast time." Report on Editorializing, supra note 2, at
1251. A licensee may be required to undertake "a diligent, good-faith effort" to communicate to
potential spokesmen his willingness to present contrasting viewpoints on the issue or issues
presented by a broadcast. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 14; see CBS, Inc., 34 F.C.C.2d 773,
777-78 (1972) (cautioning against "selection of spokesmen ... based upon what licensees believe
to be the personal motives of parties seeking an opportunity to respond"). The broadcaster is also
required to make a good faith effort "to identify the major viewpoints and shades of opinion being
debated in the community," in order to cover contrasting views adequately. Fairness Report,
supra note 2, at 15 (emphasis in original). The broadcaster, however, is not required to present
"every possible viewpoint or shade of opinion regardless of its significance." Id. at n. 16; see Robin
Ficker, 65 F.C.C.2d 657, 658 (1977). Although a broadcaster is afforded "wide discretion" in
determining the spokesman and format for presentation of contrasting views, Fairness Report,
supra note 2, at 15; see Dr. Michael Kielty, 69 F.C.C.2d 960, 961 (1978), it may not deliberately
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C. Procedure of Fairness Doctrine Review
When a viewer or listener believes that a broadcaster has presented only
one side of an issue, he must first complain to the broadcaster.4 3 If the
complainant and broadcaster are unable to resolve their differences privately,
the complainant may then file a formal complaint with the FCC."4 Such a
complaint must present prima facie evidence of a fairness doctrine violation. 45
The FCC's rationale for imposing the prima facie case requirement is to
prevent "broadcasters from being burdened with the task of answering idle or
capricious complaints' 4 6 and to safeguard a broadcaster's exercise of its
select spokesmen for opposing points of view in order to favor one viewpoint at the expense of
underrepresenting another. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 15. Furthermore, although the FCC
has declined to establish fixed ratios for determining the fairness of a broadcaster's time
allocations, it has warned that a finding of unreasonableness may be predicated on " 'imbalance
from the sheer weight of one side as against the other.' " Id. at 17 (citation omitted). Thus, if a
broadcaster presents one viewpoint during prime time, while relegating coverage of contrasting
viewpoints to less popular viewing time periods, he may be found to have acted unreasonably.
Id.; Mark J. Freeman, 66 F.C.C.2d 1049, 1050 (1976); Norman Zafman, 26 F.C.C.2d 297, 298
(1970). The "equal opportunities" requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976), covering broadcasts by
political candidates do not apply to the fairness doctrine. Fairness Primer, supra note 39, at 599;
see 44 Fed. Reg. 45,951-56 (1979). In addition to the fairness doctrine, the FCC imposes two
other obligations on broadcasters pursuant to its authority to regulate in the public interest. See
47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976). Under its Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§
73.1920-30 (1979), the FCC requires broadcasters to offer reasonable opportunities for response
whenever an attack is made on the "honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an
identified person or group" as part of "the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance," id. § 73.1920, or when a broadcaster endorses or opposes a legally qualified
candidate. Id. § 73.1930. These rules differ from the general fairness doctrine principles because
the broadcaster is not afforded discretion in choosing a spokesman for the presentation of
contrasting views. Rather, under the Personal Attack Rule, the broadcaster must offer the person
attacked a chance to reply. Id. § 73.1920. The FCC has chosen not to exempt "bona fide news
documentar[ies]' from the Personal Attack Rule, compare 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)13) (1976) with 47
C.F.R. § 73.1920(b)(4) (1979), because it is unlikely that editorial discretion would be inhibited
"in the case of a documentary, which is assembled over a period of time." 33 Fed. Reg. 5,362-63
(1968). The FCC also regulates broadcasters under the "equal opportunities" requirement of 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). Under this section, a broadcaster that permits a legally qualified candidate
for public office to use the broadcaster's facilities must afford competing candidates "equal
opportunities ... in the use of such broadcasting station." Id. Fairness doctrine obligations are
"not applicable to [§ 315] uses by candidates." Gloria W. Sage, 62 F.C.C.2d 135, 136 (1976); see
44 Fed. Reg. 45,955 (1979).
43. Broadcast Procedure Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1974).
44. Id.; e.g., American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980); Anthony R. ,artin-Trigona, 39
F.C.C.2d 25, 26 (1973).
45. To state a prima facie case, the FCC requires that a complaint: "Submit specific
information indicating (1) the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial
nature discussed over the air; (3) the date and time when the program was carried; (4) the basis
for the claim that the station has presented only one side of the question; and (5) whether the
station had afforded, or has plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
viewpoints." Fairness Primer, supra note 39, at 600; Reconsideration of the Fairness Report,
supra note 25, at 696; Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 8.
46. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 25, at 696. By placing itself between
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journalistic judgment. 47 Therefore, when a complaint fails to establish a
prima facie case, the FCC will not require a response from the broadcaster;45
when a complaint does satisfy the prima facie requirements, however, the
complaint is forwarded to the broadcaster who is afforded a "full opportunity"
to demonstrate that it has met its fairness obligations.
49
Once a complainant has satisfied the prima facie case requirements -0 and
the broadcaster has offered rebuttal evidence, the FCC determines whether
the circumstances of a particular case show that a broadcaster acted "rea-
sonably" and in "good faith" to meet its fairness doctrine obligations." The
FCC attempts to evaluate the fairness of overall programming,- 2 but claims
not to "substitute [its] judgment for that of the licensee."5 3 In practice,
complainants and broadcasters, the FCC seeks to "weed out those complaints that would burden
broadcasters without sufficient likelihood that a countervailing benefit will be gained." American
Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980). "Absent detailed and specific evidence of failure to comply with
*.. the fairness doctrine, it would be unreasonable to require licensees specifically to disprove
allegations [of fairness doctrine violations]. The Commission's policy of encouraging robust,
wide-open debate on issues of public importance would in practice be defeated if, on the basis of
vague and general charges of unfairness, we should impose upon licensees the burden of proving
the contrary by producing recordings or transcripts of all news programs, editorials, commen-
taries, and discussion of public issues many of which are treated over long periods of time." Allen
C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969).
47. E.g., CBS, ]nc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969); see Community-Serv. Broadcasting of
Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en bane).
48. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 75, at 696; Fairness Report, supra note
2, at 8; Fairness Primer, supra note 39, at 600; see Robert G. Ryan, 25 F.C.C.2d 884, 885 (1970)
("[I]f the Commission were to require stations or networks to come forward with specific evidence
such as tapes or transcripts of programs each time someone raised a fairness question . . . the
burden so cast on the stations and networks would be most onerous and would substantially
discourage the normal day-to-day presentation of broadcasts."). See also Allen C. Phelps, 21
F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969).
49. Fairness Primer, supra note 39, at 600; see Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra
note 25, at 696; Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 8.
50. Relatively few complainants satisfy the prima facie case requirements. In 1975, for
example, the FCC received approximately 3,570 fairness doctrine complaints and determined that
only 52 required the broadcaster to file a response. S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 212; see Fairness
Report, supra note 2, at 8. See also Pemberton, The Right of Access to Mass Media, in The
Rights of Americans 276, 284-95 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971); 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1037 & n.69
(1980).
51. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317, 1318 (1976); see Dr.
Michael Kielty, 69 F.C.C.2d 960, 961 (1978); ABC, 56 F.C.C.2d 275, 283 (1975); Rudolph P.
Arnold v. Station WKND, 52 F.C.C.2d 405, 406 (1975); Henry M. Buchanan, 42 F.C.C.2d 430,
432 (1973); Bernard T Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758, 760 (1971). Reasonableness is a question of fact,
"situational in nature-rooted in the facts which gave rise to the controversy." Reconsideration of
the Fairness Report, supra note 25, at 697 (citation omitted). It is also a comparative standard,
and, therefore, the reasonableness of one broadcaster must be decided by the finder of fact. Id.
52. Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 8; Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969).
53. Reconsideration of Fairness Report, supra note 25, at 697. For example, the FCC found
that a broadcaster acted reasonably when as part of a report critical of a particular organization,
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however, the FCC often relies on statistical measurements and a cursory
survey of the programming format,5 4 rather than on evidence of a licensee's
actual avoidance of fairness doctrine requirements. Recently, in Public Media
Center v. FCC,5 5 for example, the District of Columbia Circuit found that
only one of the criteria of the FCC's reasonableness inquiry supported the
finding that eight of the twelve radio stations named in a complaint violated
the fairness doctrine.5 6 Other criteria, including frequency of broadcast
presentations, placement of programming during peak hours, and diligence in
ascertaining various viewpoints,-" did not provide "clea[r] and explicitly
articulate . . . standards" sufficient to govern the behavior of licensees.5
Accordingly, the court remanded the proceeding to the FCC for clarification
of the basis for its decision. 9 On remand, the FCC reexamined the frequency
of broadcasts and the placement of programming and concluded that in
addition to the eight stations that were originally found to have acted
unreasonably, four other stations acted unreasonably in meeting fairness
obligations .60
It seems, therefore, that although the prima facie case requirement and the
reasonableness standard are intended to review overall programming and
reduce unnecessary interference with broadcasters' journalistic discretion, 6
the test may instead result in application of a "mathematical formula or
it offered to interview the organization's president. International Bhd. of Teamsters v NBC, 59
F.C.C.2d 1317, 1318-19 (1976). Similarly, when a broadcaster aired views opposing gun control
on four programs, and views favoring gun control on only three programs, the broadcaster was
still deemed to have acted reasonably. James L. Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281. 1283-84 (1976)
54. See, e.g., James L. Wailer, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281, 1283-84 (1976) (broadcaster found
reasonable based on brief review of number of broadcasts expressing opposing views of gun
control); Friends of Animals, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 804, 805-06 (1971) (broadcaster found reasonable
because various statements of those opposed to killing animals were broadcast during program
dealing with animal extermination); cases cited note 37 supra.
55. 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979). Although Public
Media Center concerned fairness doctrine complaints about public issue advertising, id- at
1324-25, the fairness principles would be equally applicable to a complaint alleging unfairness in
news reporting. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.C.C.2d 844, 850 (19741. Netmork
Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 654-55 t1969)
56. 587 F.2d at 1331-32. Complainants alleged that the broadcasters violated the fairness
doctrine by giving imbalanced treatment to the issue of the desirability of constructing nuclear
power facilities. 59 F.C.C.2d 494, 495-96 (1977). The District of Columbia Circuit found that in
evaluating the reasonableness of the broadcasters' programming, the FCC purported to consider
such factors as the amount of drive (peak listening) time given favorable and antinuclear
spokesmen, the total amount of time allocated each viewpoint, and the broadcasters' diligence in
seeking out spokesmen for opposing views. 587 F.2d at 1330. The court concluded that only the
evidence of total time allotment supported the result reached by the FCC Id at 1332
57. 587 F.2d at 1329-30.
58. Id. at 1331.
59. Id. at 1332.
60. 72 F.C.C.2d at 779-81. The four stations were found to have acted unreasonably despite
evidence that three of the four had devoted more total broadcast time to the viewpoint found to
have been given imbalanced treatment. Id. at 779-80.
61. See Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 8-9. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report. supra
note 25, at 696-97.
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mechanical requirement for achieving fairness." 62 Furthermore, if the FCC's
ultimate test for evaluating fairness doctrine performance is merely whether
the public has been left uninformed, 63 without any examination of evidence
extrinsic to the news broadcast, complainants and licensees have no meaning-
ful standards of behavior and courts lack coherent standards of review. These
consequences do not comport with the first amendment objective that "broad-
casters should have maximum editorial discretion in deciding how to fulfill
fairness doctrine obligations.
64
I. REGULATION OF BROADCAST NEWS UNDER THE
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE STANDARD
In its Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 6s the FCC em-
phasized the first amendment goal of developing "an informed public opinion
through the public dissemination of news and ideas concerning the vital
public issues of the day."'66 Thus, in addition to enforcing the fairness
doctrine, the FCC is concerned that the public's right to be informed could be
subverted by a broadcaster's distortion, 6 suppression, 68 or staging 69 of news
events. 70 Nevertheless, the FCC has consistently refused to take action on
62. Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494, 517 (1976), remanded on other grounds, 587 F.2d
1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979); accord, National Org. for Women v.
FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1971); accord, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC,
607 F.2d 438, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
64. American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980). The Supreme Court has stated that if first
amendment values are to be preserved the FCC should not be drawn "into a continuing
case-by-case determination of who should be heard and when .... To sacrifice First Amendment
protections for so speculative a gain [in rights of access] is not warranted, and it [is] well within
the Commission's discretion to construe the Act so as to avoid such a result." CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973) (footnotes omitted). See also W. C. Ponder v.
NBC, 58 F.C.C.2d 1222, 1222-23 (1976); Vincent P. Dole, M.D. v. WNBC, 54 F.C.C.2d 508,
513 (1975).
65. Report on Editorializing, supra note 2.
66. Id. at 1248.
67. See, e.g., Tri-State Broadcasting Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1240, 1243-45 (1976); Los Angeles
Irish Coalition for Fairness in the Media, 52 F.C.C.2d 681, 681-83 (1975); Action Radio Inc., 51
F.C.C.2d 803, 807-08 (1975).
68. See, e.g., Michael D. Bramble, 58 F.C.C.2d 565, 571 (1976); Wichita County Human
Rel. Comm., 50 F.C C.2d 322, 324 (1974); WOIC, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 355, 367 (1973).
69. See, e.g., Black Producer's Ass'n, 70 F.C.C.2d 1920, 1920 (1979). The critical factor
warranting FCC inquiry or investigation "is the existence or material indication . . . that a
licensee has staged news events. Otherwise, the matter would again come down to a judgment as
to what was presented, as against what should have been presented-a judgmental area for
broadcast journalism which [the FCC] must eschew." Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l
Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 657-58 (1969).
70. Report on Editorializing, supra note 2, at 1254-55. "A licensee would be abusing his
position as a public trustee . . . were he to withhold from expression over his facilities relevant
news or facts concerning a controversy or to slant or distort the presentation of such news." Id.
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complaints alleging distortion, suppression, or staging in the absence of




The FCC has never precisely defined the extrinsic evidence standard, but
rather has variously described the requisite proof as "extrinsic evidence,"7 2
"significant extrinsic evidence, ' 73 and "substantial extrinsic evidence. '7 , On
occasion, however, the FCC has supplied indications of the requisite standard
of proof. The FCC frequently refers to "testimony, in writing or otherwise,
from 'insiders' or persons who have direct personal knowledge of an inten-
tional attempt to falsify the news.""Ts Specifically, "extrinsic evidence reveal-
ing orders from the licensee, its top management, or its news management to
falsify the news,"76 is deemed sufficient to require further action by the FCC.
For example, the FCC has stated that extrinsic evidence is not presented
when a complainant merely alleges that "Commentator X has given a biased
account or analysis of a news event," or that "the true facts of the news event
are different from those presented. '77 Rather, the FCC seems to require a
complainant to come forward with substantial testimonial or documentary
evidence, extraneous to the broadcast itself, demonstrating a willful effort by
the broadcaster or its management to slant news reporting.78 Thus, the
71. See notes 80-98 infra and accompanying text.
72. E.g., Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978); Educational Broadcasting Corp., 59
F.C.C.2d 1136, 1142 (1976); KIRO, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 86, 88 (1976).
73. E.g., KMALAP, Inc., 72 F.C.C.2d 241, 243 (1979); Northwestern Ind. Broadcasting Corp.,
57 F.C.C.2d 686, 694 (1975); Alan Schultz, 53 F.C.C.2d 1215, 1217 (1975); David E. Houskins,
42 F.C.C.2d 1055, 1056 (1973); Shady Wall, 31 F.C.C.2d 484, 485 (1971); Richard B. Kay, 24
F.C.C.2d 426, 428 (1970).
74. KMAP, Inc., 72 F.C.C.2d 241, 243 (1979); Sun Newspapers, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 1025,
1025-26 (1973); Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758, 760 (1971). The FCC has defined
"substantial evidence" as "reliable and probative evidence . . . which clearly satisfie[s] the
customary preponderance of the evidence standard used in administrative proceedings." Radio
Carrollton, 69 F.C.C.2d 424, 425 (1978) (footnote omitted).
75. Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978); accord, Mary Jo Bradley, 47 F C.C.2d 1063,
1065 (1974); Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 592 (1969). See also Rudolph P Arnold, 52
F.C.C.2d 405, 408 (1975) ("Man of the Month" program not discriminatory because of reasonable
presence of women in overall programming); David E. Houskins. 42 F.C.C.2d 1055, 1056 (1973)
(referring to "statements by individuals who have personal knowledge that a licensee ordered the
news to be distorted). In Michael D. Bramble, 58 F.C.C.2d 565 (1976). FCC staff conducted a
"field investigation" when a former newsman alleged that his employer's "top management"
directed the suppression of news. The FCC concluded, however, that its staff investigation found
insufficient evidence of news suppression by the broadcaster. Id. at 572-73.
76. Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978); see Robert J. Bolan, 49 F C.C.2d 1263, 1265
(1974); Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 591-92 (1969).
77. E.g., Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978); Mrs. J. R. Paul. 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 592
(1969).
78. E.g., KMAP, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 470, 476 (1977); Universal Communications Corp., 27
F.C.C.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1971). Similarly, when the complainant alleged that the broadcaster was
the only network to carry an inaccurate report accusing the complainant of wrongdoing, the FCC
found that the broadcaster did not engage in improper news reporting. Henry M. Buchanan, 42
F.C.C.2d 430, 432 (1973). See also Robert J. Bolan, 53 F.C.C.2d 781, 781 (1975) (no extrinsic
evidence of distortion when there was an absence of "specific information which would indicate
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extrinsic evidence standard imposes a difficult burden of proof on private
citizens and public interest advocates seeking FCC action against improper
news broadcasting. Nevertheless, the standard is designed to obviate the
concern that "unduly burdensome regulation will induce broadcasters to




Complaints lodged against broadcasters for distortion are generally based
on allegations of inaccurate reporting8" or on a purposely skewed presentation
of an event or condition in the community. 8 1 The FCC believes that handling
complaints of news distortion in the absence of extrinsic evidence that a
broadcaster has engaged in deliberate misconduct, 82 would involve the FCC
in an evidentiary quagmire requiring investigation of the accuracy of a
broadcaster's report of a news event.8 3 Thus, for example, the FCC refused to
that [the broadcaster] stated or implied ... that the interview .. .took place subsequent to the
[time represented in the broadcast] and that such statement was made by [the broadcaster]
knowing it was untrue.") In addition, the FCC has ruled that discrepancies between a broadcast-
er's report of a news event and a newswire account do not constitute extrinsic evidence of news
falsification when the reporter in question did not "unreasonably" ascribe the discrepancies to his
reliance on a different dispatch by the same newswire service. RKO Gen., Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 367,
369 (1975). The FCC also found that the reporter's "exaggeration of the information" from the
newswire did not warrant FCC action. Id. at 369 n.6. In one case, however, the FCC has found
that a broadcaster's report of air temperatures "without a factual foundation for [the] readings"
constituted "extrinsic corroboration of .. .reckless disregard of easily ascertainable facts and
materials," sufficient to warrant censure. Action Radio Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 803, 807-08 (1975).
79. American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (en banc) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980); see Public Media Center v.
FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1978); National Org For Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002,
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
80. E.g., Cairo Broadcasting Co., 63 F.C.C.2d 586, 591 (1977) (charges of inaccurate report
of shooting incident); James L. Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281, 1284 (1976) (allegations of "misuse of
statistics" in newscast about gun control); Action Radio Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 803, 807-08 (1975)
(broadcaster censured for reporting air temperatures "without a factual foundation"); RKO Gen.
Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 367, 367-69 (1975) (allegation of falsification of news report).
81. See, e.g., Tri-State Broadcasting Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1240, 1244 (1976) (allegation that
broadcaster " 'delayed, altered, distorted, or censored important news stories that might displease
commercial advertisers or threaten [broadcaster's] relationship with the business and political
community' "); Los Angeles Irish Coalition for Fairness in the Media, 52 F.C.C.2d 681, 681
(1975) (claim that broadcaster "grossly and continuously distorted" the conflict in Northern
Ireland); Effingham Broadcasting Co., 51 F.C.C.2d 453, 454 (1975) (allegations of distortion In
broadcaster's coverage of complainant's appearance at a school board meeting); Shady Wall, 31
F.C.C.2d 484, 485-86 (1971) (allegations of distortion in news coverage of complainant's speech).
82. See WANV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1430, 1433 (1976) (no extrinsic evidence presented when
petitioner "has merely questioned the truth of certain news stories"); Tri-State Broadcasting Co.,
59 F.C.C.2d 1240, 1144-45 (1976) (no action warranted based on allegations that broadcaster
distorted news to assuage local sponsors when complainant failed to present "significant extrinsic
evidence of . .. deliberate distortion'); RKO, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 367, 369 (1975) (request to
submit issue of news distortion denied when petitioner "failed to submit sufficient 'extrinsic
evidence' to show that [the broadcaster] has engaged in news falsification" (citation omitted)).
83. "[I]n this democracy, no Government agency can authenticate the news, or should try to
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take action against a broadcaster who transposed questions and answers in a
news interview by splicing tapes, 84 or a broadcaster who inaccurately re-
ported during a documentary about malnutrition that an infant died from
starvation, 85 when the complainants failed to demonstrate that the broadcast-
er's actions were motivated by an intent to distort the news.
B. News Suppression
Generally, the FCC has treated allegations of news suppression and allega-
tions of news distortion similarly.86 In Universal Communications Corp.,8 7 for
example, the complainants alleged that the broadcaster suppressed news
coverage of events of interest to blacks, by incompletely reporting a statement
by a black spokesman and by failing to report a speech by another black
leader at a convocation covered by the broadcaster.8 8 The FCC decided that
the complainants' charges of news suppression were "unsupported by the
facts," and "merely established that they disagree with Universal's news
judgments. '8 9 According to the FCC, "a pattern of disagreements" does not
constitute "a pattern of distortion" 90 absent evidence of an intentional and
actual distortion in the broadcaster's coverage of the events. 9' If complainants
were not required to present such extrinsic evidence, the FCC would become
involved in reviewing the broadcaster's daily news judgments, a task it
endeavors to avoid. 92
C. News Staging
FCC review of complaints that allege news staging is based on considera-
tions similar to those used in FCC handling of complaints of news distortion
and suppression. 93 In addition to the requirement that a complainant present
extrinsic evidence that a news event has been staged, 94 the FCC considers
do so. We will therefore eschew the censor's role, including efforts to establish news distortion in
situations where Government intervention would constitute a worse danger than the possible
rigging itself." CBS Program "Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
84. CBS Program "The Selling of the Pentagon," 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 151 (1971).
85. CBS Program "Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969)
86. Although the FCC has used such terms as "rigging," "slanting," and "deliberate distor-
tion" of the news in describing proscribed practices, "the FCC believes that deliberate suppres-
sion or attempted suppression of news because of the licensee's private interests, personal
opinions or prejudices is a form of 'rigging,' "slanting,' or 'deliberate distortion' of the overall news
presentation of the station." Michael D. Bramble, 58 F.C.C.2d 565, 572 (1976) (footnote omitted)
87. 27 F.C.C.2d 1022 (1971).
88. Id. at 1023-24.
89. Id. at 1025-26.
90. Id. at 1026.
91. Id.
92. "Clearly, the Commission cannot decide that a broadcaster erred in its choice to present
film of one speaker instead of another, or that one story should have been covered instead of
another on a particular day." Id.; see, e.g., KVIAP Inc., 72 F.C.C.2d 241, 241 (1979); Witchita
County Human Rel. Comm., 50 F.C.C.2d 322, 324 (1974).
93. See notes 80-92 supra and accompanying text.
94. Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 657 (1969)- See
also ABC, 45 F.C.C.2d 41, 46 (1973).
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three other factors in determining whether a broadcaster is responsible for
such staging. First, the deliberately staged news event must be a "significant
'event' which did not in fact occur but rather is 'acted out' at the behest of
news personnel." 5s Second, the FCC carefully examines the role of the
broadcast management in directing the staging, supervising employees in
order to prevent the staging, and investigating allegations of staging by other
reporters. 96 Third, the FCC requires a broadcaster to make a thorough and
conscientious investigation of complaints of staging. 97 Accordingly, the FCC
found that a broadcaster acted improperly when the broadcaster relied upon
the denials of an inexperienced news reporter that he had not staged a filmed
event, instead of corroborating such denials by interviewing one of the
participants in the allegedly staged event. 98
D. Analysis of the Extrinsic Evidence Standard
As a formidable barrier to a complainant seeking FCC sanctions for news
distortion, suppression, or staging, the extrinsic evidence approach reflects the
FCC's strong reluctance to arbitrate disputes over the exercise of a broadcast-
er's news judgment. 99 Perhaps in recognition of the intense demands faced by
news editors in preparing to broadcast daily news programs,10 0 the FCC will
95. Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 657 (1969), see
WBBM-TV, 18 F.C.C.2d 124 (1969). In evaluating the propriety of filming and reporting an
arranged event, the FCC concluded that "while the pot party was authentic in many respects and
thus cannot be deemed a flagrantly staged event or outright fraud on the public, it ... [gave] the
impression that WBBM-TV had been invited to film a student pot gathering which was in any
event being held, whereas, in fact, its agent had induced the holding of the party." Id. at 134.
96. Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969). Tile
FCC distinguished between instances of staging instigated by employees without the knowledge
of management and staging conducted at the request of management. Id. at 657. Instances of tile
first variety would not require the FCC to investigate the broadcaster's fitness to operate;
incidents of the second type, however, would compel the FCC to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the licensee is qualified to retain a broadcast permit. Id. The FCC does not want to
jeopardize a licensee because of an isolated lapse of an employee; otherwise, broadcast jour-
nalism might be discouraged. Id.; see Black Producer's Ass'n, 70 F.C.C.2d 1920, 1928 (1979);
WBBM-TV, 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 139 (1969).
97. CBS Program "Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 n.6 (1969), quoted in ABC, 45
F.C.C.2d 41, 45 (1973).
98. WBBM-TV, 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 137 (1969). See also CBS, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 119, 128
(1973) (broadcaster was "derelict" in investigating allegations of staging when broadcaster "did
not make a thorough investigation of its own, and discovered facts of significance only after the
Commission confronted it with evidence contrary to its original statements and requested further
investigation').
99. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 32 F.C.C.2d 824, 825 (1971); see Black
Producer's Ass'n, 70 F.C.C.2d 1920, 1930 (1979); A. Burton White, M.D., 18 F.C.C.2d 658, 659
(1969); Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 1.
100. "Any attempt to evaluate such complaints as to 'what should have been broadcast' as
against, or in addition to, what had been broadcast would place this agency in the role of national
arbiter of the news; in fact, dictator of which news items should be broadcast. Since there are
only so many hours in the broadcast day ... it obviously is impossible for each licensee to present
as much news about every event as every member of the public might desire," Kenneth M.
Cooper, 39 F.C.C.2d 1000, 1002 (1973). See also American Security Council Educ. Foundation
v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
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review a broadcaster's judgments only under certain exigencies: when a
complainant sets forth substantial, highly probative evidence indicating that a
broadcaster has seriously abused its journalistic discretion in news report-
ing.1" 1 The extrinsic evidence standard thereby minimizes FCC oversight
when government intervention in news broadcasting would constitute more of
a threat to freedom of speech and press than the broadcaster's alleged
infringement of the public's right to be informed.
Ill. REGULATION OF BROADCAST NEWS UNDER CONFLICTING STANDARDS
A. The Evolution of Inconsistent Standards of Review
By its adoption of the extrinsic evidence standard, the FCC attempted to
distinguish complaints that would be reviewed under the fairness doctrine
evidentiary standards and those that would be resolved under a more rigorous
standard. The rationale for these different standards of review is the FCC's
determination that its proper role as a regulatory agency charged with
protecting the public interest in utilization of broadcast frequencies 0 2 is to
oversee the "fairness" or "balance" of news reporting, but not to become an
insurer of its "accuracy" or "truth."'01 3 In Network Coverage of the Democratic
National Convention,10 4 for example, the FCC stated that the fairness
doctrine would apply only to ensure that a broadcaster provides opportunities
for presentation of contrasting viewpoints. 0 s The FCC rejected any applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine "to determine whether [news coverage] is fair in
the sense of presenting the 'truth' of an event as the Commission might see
it.' 0 6 Furthermore, if the FCC were to assume the role of "national arbiter of
the truth," it would improperly intrude in the domain of "the journalistic
judgment of the networks."' 07
The factual circumstances in Democratic National Convention permitted a
relatively facile distinction between allegations of unfairness and news stag-
ing, 0 8 but since that decision, the demarcation between fairness and distor-
tion complaints has become less clear. More recent complaints of improper
101. See Star Stations of Indiana, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 105-09, affd, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) (broadcaster's application for license renewal denied
when, in addition to other misconduct, the general manager testified that the station's principal
owner instructed him to slant news reporting in order to provide favorable coverage for a U.S.
Senate candidate).
102. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(r) (1976). See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 109 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969).
103. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317, 1320 (1976) ("Rather
than determining the truth or falsity of [news reports], the Commission deems it more appropriate
to assure that a reasonable opportunity is afforded for the presentation of contrasting view-
points."); see Alan Schultz, 53 F.C.C.2d'1215, 1217 (1975); Rudolph P. Arnold, 52 F.C.C.2d 405,
408 (1975).
104. 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969).
105. Id. at 654.
106. Id. at 655.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 656. The complainants alleged that television crews of the major networks staged
protests and fabricated incidents of bodily injuries to anti-war demonstrators outside the
Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968. Id. at 651.
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news presentation have been framed in amorphous terms such as
"bias," 0 9 "advocacy,"" 0 "inaccuracy,"'' "news management,"" 12 "discrim-
inatory weighting of news items," 1 3 and "censorship and news manipula-
tion."' 14 In ruling on such variously defined allegations of improper news
reporting, the FCC has generally attempted to resolve claims of bias and
advocacy under the fairness doctrine standards,' Is while ruling on complaints
of inaccuracy, news management manipulation, and distortion under the
extrinsic evidence standard. 116 Although it disposes of such complaints ac-
cording to these markedly different standards, the FCC has provided little
explanation of how it determines which standard will be applied to a
particular complaint.
Furthermore, despite the theoretical benefits of the FCC's policy of distin-
guishing unreasonable conduct under the fairness doctrine 17 from willful
conduct under the distortion and suppression rationale, 118 this distinction
becomes tenuous when viewers complain of bias, advocacy, inaccuracy, and
manipulation. Realistically, any of the latter complaints may arise out of
either unreasonable or willful conduct by a broadcaster. For example, in
Newhouse Broadcasting Corp.,119 the complainants' characterizations of im-
proper news presentation ranged from "gross misrepresentation and distortion
of the coverage of news, especially for the Black community,' 20 to "anti-
109. Cairo Broadcasting Co., 63 F.C.C.2d 586, 591-92 (1977); Newhouse Broadcasting
Corp., 61 F.C.C.2d 528, 541 (1976); James L. Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281, 1281 (1976).
110. American Security Council Educ. Foundation, 63 F.C.C.2d 366, 367 (1977); J. Allen
Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894, 894 (1971).
111. James L. Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281, 1281-82 (1976).
112. ABC, 56 F.C.C.2d 275, 275 (1975); David E. Houskins, 42 F.C.C.2d 1055, 1055 (1973).
113. National Org. for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978); see Pulley v. Station WBFN, 58 F.C.C.2d
1224, 1227 (1976).
115. See Cairo Broadcasting Co., 63 F.C.C.2d 586, 591-93 (1977); American Security Council
Educ. Foundation, 63 F.C.C.2d 366, 367-68 n.2 (1977), rev'd, No. 77-1443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13,
1978), vacated on rehearing en banc, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (affirming FCC decision),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980); Newhouse Broadcasting Corp., 61 F.C.C.2d 528, 541 (1976);
James L. Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281, 1281-84 (1976); J. Allen Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894, 895-97
(1971). When complainants combine allegations of "bias" with allegations of "distortion" or
"suppression," the FCC applies the extrinsic evidence standard. See KIRO, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d
86, 87-88 (1976); Vincent P. Dole, M.D. v. Station WNBC-TV, 54 F.C.C.2d 508, 513-14 (1975);
The Outlet Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 355, 363 (1972); Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 591-92 (1969).
In some instances, however, the FCC has applied the extrinsic evidence standard to bare
allegations of bias. See Robin Ficker, 66 F.C.C.2d 1044, 1044-45 (1976); Cliff Wilmath, 41
F.C.C.2d 603, 604 (1973).
116. National Org. for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Jim Myers, 69
F.C.C.2d 963, 965 (1978); James L. Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281, 1284 (1976); ABC, 56 F.C.C.2d
275, 276 (1975); David E. Houskins, 42 F.C.C.2d 1055, 1056 (1973).
117. Fairness doctrine violations are usually considered to arise from a "failure" to give
adequate coverage to a certain viewpoint or issue. See Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 10.
118. Such cases are usually considered to present the issue of whether the broadcaster
engaged in "deliberate" or intentional activity. See, e.g., CBS Program "Hunger in America," 20
F.C.C.2d 143, 150 (1969); Tri-State Broadcasting Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1240, 1245 (1976).
119. 61 F.C.C.2d 528 (1976).
120. Id. at 532 (footnote omitted).
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Black bias"'121 to "blacking out" the complainants' press releases. 122 In
rejecting the complainants' petition to deny renewal of a broadcast license, the
FCC applied the extrinsic evidence standard to the allegations of distortion
and misrepresentation, 2 3 and fairness doctrine evidentiary standards to alle-
gations of bias and "blacking out" the press releases. 1'2 4 Yet, in applying the
two different standards, the FCC did not explain why it considered the
factual allegations distinguishable and used almost identical reasoning to
support its rulings. 
25
In another case, the FCC appeared to have decided allegations of imbal-
ance or unfairness not under the reasonableness test, but by applying the
extrinsic evidence standard. In WSM, Inc., ' 2 6 the complainants claimed that
the broadcaster's televised news program "improperly emphasize[d] the less
attractive aspects of Nashville's black community ... tend[ing] to perpetuate
a perceived link between blacks and crime."' 2 Although these allegations
would seem to involve imbalanced or unfair reporting,' 2 8 the FCC construed
the claims as allegations of "deliberate distortion, slanting or staging,' 129 and
concluded that the complainants failed to establish that the broadcaster
abused "[t]he broad discretion accorded a broadcast licensee in the exercise of
professional news judgment.' 130
In addition, due to the lack of clarity in the FCC's decisions, viewer
complaints often reflect confusion over the FCC's application of the fairness
doctrine and extrinsic evidence standards. In one case a complainant equated
121. Id. at 534.
122. Id. at 540.
123. Id. at 535.
124. Id. at 540-41.
125. Compare id. at 535 ("IT]he Commission has consistently held that it is not the national
arbiter of truth in broadcast journalism. Absent extrinsic evidence of deliberate distortion or
staging, we are prohibited from substituting our judgment for the reasonable, good faith
journalistic judgment of the licensee." (citation omitted)) with id. at 541 ('[Tlhe Commission does
not sit to review the broadcaster's news judgments. Clearly, we cannot decide that a broadcaster
erred in its choice that one event should be covered instead of another on a particular day In
reviewing fairness or news bias complaints, we eschew the role of censor
126. 66 F.C.C.2d 994 (1977).
127. Id. at 996.
128. Id.; cf. Cairo Broadcasting Co., 63 FC.C.2d 586, 591-93 t1977) tallegations of bias in
news coverage of the black community decided under fairness doctrine), James L Waller. 57
F.C.C.2d 1281, 1284 (1976) (allegations of "inaccuracy" in coverage of gun control decided under
extrinsic evidence standard). In Robin Ficker, 66 F.C.C.2d 1044 (1976), without distinguishing
its prior decisions applying the fairness doctrine to allegations of biased news reporting, the FCC
disposed of a complaint of news bias by applying the extrinsic evidence standard Id at 1045.
The complainant alleged that the broadcaster violated the fairness doctrine by giving inadequate
coverage to his election campaign and was "biased against [his] campaign" because of his political
outlook and a pending, unrelated suit against the broadcaster. Id. at 1044. Although the FCC
applied the fairness doctrine in deciding that the complainant's allegations of inadequate coverage
lacked merit, id. at 1044-45, the FCC disposed of complainant's allegations of bias b) applying
the extrinsic evidence standard. Id. at 1045. In so doing, however, the FCC at no point explained
why it applied different standards to the related allegations. See id. at 1044-45. note 115 supra
129. WSM, Inc., 66 F.C.C.2d 994, 997 (1977).
130. Id.
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news suppression with fairness doctrine violation,1 31 while another complain-
ant expressed the belief that "the Commission allows only the showing by
extrinsic evidence of bad faith on the part of the licensee to support a fairness
doctrine violation.' 32 It is arguable, therefore, that the FCC's inconsistent
standards of review are too indeterminate and imprecise for application of the
fairness doctrine to satisfy the delicate balancing of interests required by the
first amendment.
B. American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC
The difficulty in comporting with first amendment considerations that is
engendered by the FCC's inability to delineate cogently the circumstances in
which it will apply the reasonableness test of the fairness doctrine or the
extrinsic evidence standard, is demonstrated by American Security Council
Education Foundation v. FCC.133 Based on an extensive study of all CBS
Evening News broadcasts televised during 1972, the American Security
Council Education Foundation (ASCEF)134 complained that the network
"violated the fairness doctrine with respect to the coverage of 'national
131. Mary Jo Bradley, 47 F.C.C.2d 1063, 1065 (1974). In another case, a complainant
seeking FCC action to correct allegedly incomplete reporting of the Vietnam War, expressly
refused to frame his complaint in terms of a fairness doctrine violation or willful distortion, but
instead chose to rely on "the public's right to adequate news coverage" as the basis for his claim.
Kenneth M. Cooper, 39 F.C.C.2d 1000, 1002 (1973).
132. ABC, 56 F.C.C.2d 275, 283 (1975). The FCC has often stated that it deems Its
regulation of broadcast news to be more appropriate under the fairness doctrine than under the
extrinsic evidence standard. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317,
1320 (1976); Alan Schultz, 53 F.C.C.2d 1215, 1217 (1975); Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758,
760 (1971). The District of Columbia Circuit, however, recently concluded that "[glenerally the
licensee's news judgment will not be questioned [by the FCC] unless there is extrinsic evidence of
deliberate distortion or news staging . . . or unless the licensee consistently fails to report news
events of public importance that could not in good faith be ignored." National Org. for Women v.
FCC, 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
133. 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
134. ASCEF transcribed televised reports dealing with "United States military and foreign
affairs; Soviet Union military and foreign policy; China military and foreign policy; and Vietnam
affairs." Id. at 441-42. The transcribed reports were then broken down into sentences and
compared to what ASCEF considered to be three major positions on national security issues:
Viewpoint A included coverage perceiving the threat to United States security as more serious
than regarded by the government and desiring increased national security effort; Viewpoint B
included coverage perceived as agreeing with government national security policies; and View-
point C included coverage perceiving threats to United States security as less serious than
regarded by the government and desiring "decreased" national security efforts. The government
view was deemed to be the position of the Nixon administration. Id. at 442, 479-80. ASCEF
reviewed CBS Evening News broadcasts for 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1976, in addition to other
CBS news and public affairs programming. 63 F.C.C.2d 366, 367 (1977). ASCEF is a private
organization that describes itself as " 'a non-profit educational institution whose purpose is to
improve public understanding of facts and issues relating to the national security of [the United
States].' " 607 F.2d at 452. (Wright, C.J., concurring). Others have termed ASCEF a " 'Cold War
college' to train leaders for the battle against Communism." Levine, Anti-Communist Group
Lobbies to Keep U.S. a Military Superpower, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1, quoted in F.
Friendly, supra note 5, at 168.
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security issues' ",'3s by engaging in "advocacy journalism."'13 6 The ASCEF
requested the FCC to direct CBS to provide opportunities for presentation of
contrasting views on issues of national security and to offer "'compensatory
opportunities . . . to help balance the years [of] non-coverage of such
views.' "137
The FCC ruled that the ASCEF complaint did not state a prima facie
fairness doctrine violation because it failed to present a sufficiently "well-
defined issue" to which CBS allegedly afforded imbalanced coverage.1 38
Under the rubric of "national security," the FCC found that ASCEF had
included such topics as "'Soviet and Chinese political and military objec-
tives,' "'domestic foreign policy,' "Chinese military and non-military
policies," and "Southeast Asia and foreign relations generally. 11 39 According
to the FCC, to require a broadcaster "to refute a broad claim of imbalance on
a general, far-reaching issue," 14 0 could have a "'chilling effect' on the
journalistic efforts of a broadcaster." Therefore, the FCC declined to require
CBS to respond to the ASCEF complaint. 14 1
Although a three judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the decision of the FCC and remanded the action for further proceedings, ' 42
the FCC's decision was ultimately affirmed by the majority of the court sitting
en banc.143 The court agreed that ASCEF failed to define properly the issue
to which CBS allegedly accorded imbalanced coverage.' 44 According to the
majority, the diverse topics ASCEF included under the heading of national
security1 45 lacked the cohesive interrelationship necessary to enable the FCC
to determine whether a broadcast dealing with one issue could be viewed as
supporting or conflicting with a broadcast about another. ' 46 The majority also
expressed the concern that FCC review of CBS's conduct might upset the
balancing of interests required by the first amendment "by inducing broad-
135. 63 F.C.C.2d at 366.
136. Id. at 367. Specifically, the ASCEF study found that of the sentences transcribed, 3.54%
reflected Viewpoint A, 34.63% reflected Viewpoint B, and 61.83% reflected Viewpoint C. 607
F.2d at 442-43, 481.
137. 63 F.C.C.2d at 367.
138. Id. at 368; see pt. I(c) supra.
139. 63 F.C.C.2d at 368.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 370.
142. No. 77-1443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1978). The three judge panel found that "ASCEF's
complaint ... made the relevant issue as plain as day: whether this nation should do more, less
or the same about perceived threats to its national security." Id., slip op. at IS.
143. 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
144. Id. at 448.
145. ASCEF included in the national security issue such diverse topics as NATO, detente
with China, amnesty for Vietnam War draft evaders, and SALT. Id. at 449.
146. The court referred to the national security issue as an "umbrella concept," encompassing
issues with only a tangential relationship. "Consideration of the issues together, rather than
individually, would not provide a basis for determining whether the broadcaster presented a
reasonable balance of conflicting views because views on any one issue do not support or
contradict views on the others." Id.
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casters to forego programming on controversial issues or by disrupting the
normal exercise of journalistic judgment in such programming that is
aired. 1 4 7 Furthermore, the court recognized the potential interference with
news broadcasting that could be caused by overly rigorous enforcement of the
fairness doctrine:
The broadcasting of daily news demands the exercise of enormous editorial skill. The
news editor must select from the vast array of the day's fast-moving events those
which, in the limited amount of broadcast time available, should be presented to the
public. In attempting to comply with the fairness doctrine as interpreted by ASCEF,
an editor's news judgment would be severely altered."4
Thus, the court concluded that ASCEF's attempt to impose a regimen of
balance upon news broadcasting "would not promote the public interest
[because] the limitations on the exercise of news judgment would be unjus-
tified. "149
Chief Judge Wright concurred in the majority's decision to affirm the FCC's
application of the prima faci6 case requirement because he believed the
decision would properly prevent the agency from "serv[ing] merely as a
conduit for all charges made against broadcasters under the fairness doc-
trine."'10 Were the FCC to remove the limited procedural protection afforded
by the prima facie case requirement, "[t]imidity might well supplant curiosity
as the operative journalistic ethic in . . . coverage of public events.''""
Judge Bazelon also concurred in the majority's analysis of the prima facie
case requirement. 152 Yet, he questioned the validity of the fairness doctrine in
general, stating that it "poses a serious threat to the independence of the
broadcast press."' 5 3 Furthermore, Judge Bazelon doubted "whether the ap-
plication of the fairness doctrine to daily news coverage, absent bad faith or
deliberate distortion, could ever meet the FCC's statutory mandate or the
dictates of the First Amendment."'
1 54
147. Id. at 451.
148. Id. (footnote omitted).
149. Id. (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 453 (Wright, C.J., concurring). See also 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1032 (1980).
151. 607 F.2d at 453. The Chief Judge agreed that "fo require CBS to respond to such an
ill-defined charge would . . . threaten to chill future communications." Id. at 454. He also noted
that the FCC's prima facie case requirement is "a formidable procedural barrier, but one that is
not insurmountable to complainants with legitimate fairness doctrine claims." Id. at 453 (footnote
omitted). The prima facie case requirement demonstrates, in the Chief Judge's view, that the
FCC "conscious[ly] shrink[s] back, as it were," recognizing that its "regulatory domain overlaps
that of the First Amendment." Id. at 454 (footnote omitted). Chief Judge Wright did speculate,
however, that a study patterned after ASCEF's might succeed if it were "structured around a
highly specific issue," id. at 458 (footnote omitted), "reflect[edj a high level of qualitative
correspondence between its narrowly defined issue and the subjects dealt with by the news Items
evaluated in the study," id., and attempted "to achieve a true objectivity not based on the
spurious notion that any single [presidential] administration is uniformly centrist in its positions."
Id. at 459.
152. Id. at 460 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 459 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 459-60 (footnotes omitted).
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The three dissenting judges argued that the FCC and the majority errone-
ously applied the fairness doctrine's prima facie case requirement by "infus-
[ing] the standard with an element of discretion, and hence vagueness,
painfully at odds with the precision customarily required of regulation affect-
ing speech."'15 5 Furthermore, the dissent contended that the issues presented
by ASCEF's complaint were "as plain as day," and that the FCC's inability to
grasp the concreteness of the national security issue was due to "a willful
obtuseness."'15 6 The dissent extensively examined the methodology of
ASCEF's study'5 7 and concluded that the FCC "has seen fit to convert the
prima facie evidence standard into an open-ended 'prudential' doctrine allow-
ing [it] to decline jurisdiction over hard cases."'1 8
C. Analysis of American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC
and Inconsistent Standards of Review
In addition to the diversity of opinions offered by the FCC and the District
of Columbia Circuit, ASCEF's complaint has provoked a fair amount of
criticism from commentators and the broadcasting industry. '" One commen-
tator has expressed the fear that other special interest groups may be
encouraged by the ASCEF complaint to obtain additional news coverage by
conducting their own studies and "repeatedly involve the federal government,
via the FCC in second-guessing the news judgments of broadcast journalists
who must make decisions based on the news demands of each day. "160
Although such concerns may be allayed by the failure of ASCEF's complaint,
it seems likely that a similar complaint might overcome the FCC's prima facie




It is in this context that the shortcomings inherent in the indistinction
between applicability of the fairness doctrine standards and extrinsic evidence
standard become manifest. Although ASCEF couched its complaint against
CBS in terms of a fairness doctrine violation, 162 the study underlying the
155. Id. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (MacKinnon, J. & Robb, J_, joining)-
156. Id. at 465. According to the dissent, ASCEF's complaint and accompanying report
identified a discrete issue: "whether this nation should do more, less, or the same about perceived
threats to its national security." Id. (emphasis omitted).
157. Id. at 460-73.
158. Id. at 460 (emphasis omitted).
139. See F. Friendly, supra note 5, at 167-91. S. Simmons. supra note 5. at 207-08, Criticism
of the ASCEF complaint is usually directed at the methodology of ASCEF's study- One of the
major criticisms is that by placing the Nixon presidential administration at the center (Viewpoint
B) of its national security spectrum, ASCEF distorted the results, in effect predetermining the
finding of a small percentage of "A" viewpoints. See F Friendly, supra note 5. at 174; S.
Simmons, supra note 5, at 207.
160. S. Simmons, supra note 5, at 208. See also F. Friendly, supra note S. at 183-84 t"a dozen
zealots in a dozen other life-and-death areas-energy, the environment, unemployment, hunger,
cancer, the cities--will testify [that] television slights them too")
161. E.g., Public Media Center. 59 F.C.C.2d 494 (1976) (nuclear power plants), remanded,
587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979), James L. Waller, 57
F.C.C.2d 1281 (1976) (gun control); Michael McKee. 49 F.C.C 2d 1258 (1974) (abortion).
162. 63 F.C.C.2d at 366.
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complaint frequently charged CBS with "advocacy"'163 of a particular view of
national security as well as "bias"' 164 in covering such related issues. In
addition, ASCEF's study accused CBS of "seriously deficient factual report-
ing"' 65 and presenting viewers with a "highly distorted view of the U.S.
Armed Forces.' 66 The FCC quickly dispensed with ASCEF's allegations of
"bias," construing the use of the term "to mean an imbalance of contrasting
views."'1 67 The District of Columbia Circuit concurred with the FCC's
assessment, concluding that ASCEF did not allege that "CBS deliberately
distorted the news."
1 68
It is submitted that at the core of ASCEF's complaint is an allegation that
CBS improperly exercised its news judgment. Essentially, ASCEF sought
government intervention to force the broadcaster to report ASCEF's percep-
tion of the "truth" concerning United States national security. 169 Viewed from
this perspective, the ASCEF complaint differs little from numerous other
complaints to which the FCC has applied the extrinsic evidence standard. 7 0
Had the FCC applied the extrinsic evidence standard, needless litigation
would have been avoided because ASCEF presented no evidence that CBS
intentionally misrepresented news events or deliberately underrepresented
opposing viewpoints. 7 1 Nonetheless, ASCEF's phrasing of its complaint in
terms of a fairness doctrine violation allowed it to circumvent the stringent
evidentiary requirements of the extrinsic evidence standard.172 Furthermore,
had ASCEF succeeded in overcoming the specific issue criterion of the prima
facie case requirement,173 the FCC would have been compelled to examine
the reasonableness of CBS's daily news judgments made over the course of a
year. 17 4 Such a result would appear inconsistent with the traditional reluc-
tance of the government to interfere with a broadcaster's journalistic discre-
tion. 175
163. 607 F.2d at 482-83, 486.
164. Id. at 482.
165. Id. at 484.
166. Id. at 486.
167. 63 F.C.C.2d at 368 n.2.
168. 607 F.2d at 451 n.41.
169. See notes 133-41 supra and accompanying text. In its study, ASCEF alleged that as a
result of CBS's treatment of national security, "the attentive viewer throughout 1972 would never
have heard a clear-cut statement to the effect that the Soviet Union was militarily superior to the
United States." 607 F.2d at 484 (emphasis in original).
170. See notes 72-98 supra and accompanying text.
171. See American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 462 n,9 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980).
172. See pt. II supra.
173. See pt. I supra.
174. In reversing the decision of the FCC, the three judge panel of the District of Columbia
Circuit assumed that "national security" constituted a controversial issue of public importance
and remanded the proceeding to the FCC for further action. American Security Council Educ.
Foundation v. FCC, No. 77-1443, slip op. at 28-29 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1978). Had CBS been
directed to respond to ASCEF's complaint, it would have been compelled to review its entire
news programming broadcast over several years. The burden of such a task upon the broadcaster
would have been enormous. 607 F.2d at 451; see notes 9, 19 supra.
175. Congress explicitly prohibited the FCC from censoring broadcast programming. 47
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CONCLUSION
Although the objectives of the fairness doctrine should continue to be
pursued, it must be recognized that inhibitory effects may inhere in any
complaint, regardless of its form, challenging a broadcaster's editorial judg-
ment. Therefore, the first amendment goals of vigorous and open public
debate would be furthered by applying the extrinsic evidence standard to
adjudication of all disputes concerning improper news reporting. Adoption of
this approach would not only result in more consistent and coherent FCC
resolution of these disputes, but would also strike an equitable balance
between the public's interests and those of the broadcasters. 7 6 First, viewers
U.S.C. § 326 (1976); see note 39 supra. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
wide scope of journalistic discretion afforded broadcasters: "For better or worse, editing is what
editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or
broadcast--can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the
discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher
values. The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the
reality that these risks were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of
moderation and a sense of responsibility--and civility--on the part of those who exercise the
guaranteed freedoms of expression." CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25
(1973); see notes 10, 15, 16 supra.
176. The proposed approach for FCC regulation of broadcast news may be supported by
recent Supreme Court decisions affecting both the public and broadcast industry. In Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the first amendment does not shield the
editorial process of broadcast journalists from pre-trial discovery in defamation cases. Id. at
174-75. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that its holding should not be construed to mean
that "editorial discussions or exchanges have no constitutional protection from casual inquiry.
There is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or official examination merely... to
serve some general end such as the public interest; and if there were, it would not survive
constitutional scrutiny ... ." Id. at 174. Thus, the current administration of the fairness doctrine
may have only precarious validity because it purports to justify government regulation of the
reasonableness of broadcast news reporting by a need to promote the "public interest." See
American Security Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 459-60 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 662 (1980). The public interest in
receiving accurate information about newsworthy events, however, can be protected without
unnecessary interference with the editorial process. For example, before a public figure plaintiff
can recover damages for defamation, it is essential that he prove that the allegedly defamatory
*utterance was made " 'with actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' " Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 156 (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). Accordingly, to avoid "self-
censorship" by the media, recovery is "conditioned on the specified showing of culpable conduct."
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 159. Analogously, extension of the extrinsic evidence standard to
FCC review of all complaints of improper news reporting would protect broadcast journalism
from government sanctions except when a complainant adequately demonstrates that a broadcast-
er had deliberately distorted the news. See pt. II supra. Both the FCC, in enunciating its
extrinsic evidence standard, and the Supreme Court in establishing the "actual malice" require-
ment, stressed the need to permit criticism of public officials and to preserve public debate.
Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (recognizing the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
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and listeners would be assured that broadcast licensees would not superficially
cover news events in order to avoid fairness doctrine obligations, and would be
afforded a means of redress against licensees who seek to subvert the public
interest. 1 77 Second, broadcasters could retain broad editorial discretion in
deciding how to cover news events and controversial issues so long as they do
not deliberately engage in improper news reporting. 7 8 Accordingly, the FCC
should apply the extrinsic evidence standard to all complaints of improper
news reporting to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail.' 179
Christopher William Jones
attacks on government and public officials.") with Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l
Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 660 (1969) (stating that "[t]he right to be critical of public officials
is ... well engrained in the first amendment .... Indeed, one of the most fundamental purposes
of the amendment is to insure the freedom of the press to criticize Government.").
177. See pts. II-IlI supra.
178. See pt. II supra.
179. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
